OCR special
Divine command theory
Jon Mayled considers an often-overlooked branch of ethics
In light of the definition below, how far may morality be seen as dependent on God?
‘Divine command theory: Actions are right or wrong depending on whether they follow God’s commands or not ̓
Divine command theory is not unique to Christianity, and many religions — both monotheistic and polytheistic — share the same belief.
There have been a number of different versions of divine command theory across the centuries, by such thinkers as Augustine (354–430), Thomas Aquinas (1225–74), Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308), William of Ockham (1285–1347), John Calvin (1509– 64), Descartes (1596–1650) and, more recently, Robert (Bob) Merrihew Adams (b.1937). Naturally, there have also been many criticisms.
Plato’s challenge
One of the earliest challenges is that of Plato (428/427 or 424/423–348/347 BCE) in the Euthyphro dilemma. This dilemma is presented as Socrates speaking to Euthyphro of Prospalta, an Athenian religious prophet known only through references by Plato in Euthyphro and Cratylus.
Socrates challenges Euthyphro with this question:
‘Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods? ̕
This first option says that certain actions are good because God commands them ’ — it is the command of God that makes something good or bad. This means that if God commanded ‘Make a fat profit’, then it would be right — this makes God’s commands arbitrary. Leibniz in his Discourse on Metaphysics sums this up:
‘So in saying that things are not good by any rule of goodness, but sheerly by the will of God, it seems to me that one destroys, without realising it, all the love of God and all his glory. For why praise him for what he has done if he would be equally praiseworthy in doing the contrary? ̕
The second option says that God commands things because they are right or wrong in themselves. Murder is wrong in ’itself and that is why God forbids it. God can see that it destroys life and makes people unhappy, and so it is unlikely that he would ever command it. However, this option seems to be arguing that there is a standard of right and wrong which is independent of God and which influences his commands. James Rachels (1941–2003) argued that it is unacceptable for religious belief to involve unqualified obedience to God’s commands as it means abandoning personal autonomy — the rightness of an action must come from the fact that the action is right in itself.
The theory
Augustine
Augustine saw ethics as being the pursuit of a supreme good which would bring human happiness. In order to do this humans must love things that are worthy of human love. This requires loving God so that they know what else they should love.
Aquinas
Aquinas’ theory of natural moral law argued that something is moral if it works towards the purpose of human existence, and so human nature can determine what is moral.
Duns Scotus
John Duns Scotus argued that humans should love one another and love God and God cannot take away these obligations. He said that natural moral law contained only what was self-evidently analytically true and that God could not falsify these statements. Therefore the commands of natural moral law do not depend on God’s will. The first three of the Ten Commandments are obligations to God. The remaining commandments are morally obligatory because God commands them.
William of Ockham
According to William of Ockham, ‘Given the ordination that is now in force, no act is perfectly virtuous unless it is elicited in conformity with right reason’ (Quaestione variae OT VIII, 394). However, if God commanded us to be murderers, reason would say that this is wrong, and we are only saved from this dilemma by God’s generosity.
John Calvin
John Calvin argued that God has the divine right to command. Humans should obey divine laws in order to worship God. God’s commands provide instruction for ‘inward spiritual righteousness’ and ‘outward decency’ (Institutes 2.8.5).
Descartes
The divine command theory of everything is sometimes attributed to Descartes. The following is part of a conversation between Burman and Descartes (16 April 1648):
‘For it is impossible to imagine that anything is thought of in the divine intellect as good or true, or worthy of belief or omission, prior to the decision of the divine will to make it so.’ [6th replies CSMII 291]‘
‘[Burman] But what then of God’s ideas of possible things? Surely those are prior to his will.’
‘[Descartes] These too depend on God, like everything else. His will is the cause not only of what is actual and to come, but also of what is possible and of the simple natures. There is nothing we can think of or ought to think of that should not be said to depend on God.’
‘[Burman] But does it follow from this that God could have commanded a creature to hate him, and thereby made this a good thing to do?’
‘[Descartes] God could not now do this, but we simply do not know what he could have done. In any case, why should he not have been able to give this command to one of his creatures?
Cottingham, J., Stoothoff, R. and Murdoch , D.(1985) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. 1, Cambridge University Press
Robert Adams
Robert Merrihew Adams proposes a ‘modified Divine Command theory’. He argues that the following statements are equivalent:
■ It is wrong to do X.
■ It is contrary to God’s commands to do X.
He proposes that God’s commands come before moral truths and must be explained in terms of these and not the other way around. He argues that an action is only morally wrong if it defies the commands of a loving God. If God commanded cruelty, then he would not be loving.
In Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov, Ivan says that ‘without God everything is permitted’ — so does God give a reason to be moral? In Albert Camus’ The Stranger, the issue of meaning is a central theme: Mersault does not condemn any action as wrong and, when he ends up shooting a complete stranger, he is only sorry that he got caught — killing someone has no more meaning than any other action.
Adams attempts to answer the argument that morality might be arbitrary, as moral commands are not based solely on the commands of God, but are founded on his omnibenevolence.
Objections
■ William Wainwright of the University of Wisconsin argued that ‘being commanded by God’ and ‘being obligatory’ did not mean the same thing. He used the example of water not having an identical meaning to H2 O. He also suggested that divine command theory might imply that one can only have moral knowledge if one has knowledge of God (Religion and Morality, 2005).
■ Edward Wierenga of the University of Rochester writes that if divine command theory is correct it seems to deny atheists and agnostics moral knowledge.
■ Hugh Storer Chandler mounts a modal challenge to the theory. He writes that even if it is accepted that being commanded by God and being morally right are the same, they may not be synonyms because they could be different in other possible worlds.
■ Michael Austin of Eastern Kentucky University argues that divine command theory can be criticised for prompting people to be moral with impure motivations. He continues that a moral life should be sought because morality is valued, not to avoid punishment or receive a reward. He also cites the objection from autonomy, which argues that morality requires an agent to freely choose which principles they live by. This challenges the view that God’s will determines what is good because humans are then no longer autonomous, but followers of an imposed moral law. Therefore, autonomy becomes incompatible with divine command theory. He further considers that in a world of religious pluralism, it is impossible to know which god’s or religion’s commands should be followed.
So, despite its seeming simplicity, divine command theory can be seen to be complex and by no means a position which everyone shares.
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