Edexcel special
Religious language
This ‘Edexcel special’ looks at how to tackle a question on aspects of religious language
Candidates are usually confident writing about verification and falsification but lack confidence when asked to write about other forms of religious language. Here we examine the first part of a two-part essay question which is specifically aimed at myth, symbol and language games.
Exam advice is provided to help you apply the sample answer to your own work.
Question (a)
‘Religious language is too difficult to understand.’
Examine this claim with reference to myth and symbol AND language games. (18 marks)
Paragraph 1 could include an explanation of how religious language:
• is indirect
• is metaphorical
• is anachronistic
• makes use of analogy
• needs to be interpreted
• is problematic in its use of everyday human language to describe God
Religious language may be deemed ‘too difficult to understand’ because the subject matter is transcendent and metaphysical and yet we only have everyday, human language with which to speak of God and religious matters. As a result, religious language may be too indirect and rely on making use of metaphors and analogies which need to be interpreted. Since these interpretations are likely to be subjective, it is open to misunderstanding and disagreement. It has been suggested that use of religious language as a whole is anachronistic and no longer compatible with today’s scientific perspective on the world: ‘It is impossible to use electric light and the wireless and to avail ourselves of modern medical surgical discoveries and at the same time to believe in the New Testament world of demons and spirits’ (Bultmann).
Paragraph 2 could include an explanation of the difference between cognitive and non-cognitive language, and whether/how they affect the principle that religious language is ‘too difficult to understand’.
Language broadly falls into two categories — cognitive language which is intended to convey facts that can be verified or falsified, and non-cognitive language which does not contain factual, literal significance but which serves some other function. Cognitive statements which are intended to have factual content may be immediately understandable to the believer, but to the non-believer without knowing how the claim may be verified or falsified, the statement is nonsense. Cognitive statements depend on empirical observation to support their claims, and religious language claims are open to the charge that since they cannot be observed they cannot ever be understood.
Paragraph 3 could include an explanation of the use of myth, and why it may lead to the charge of religious language being ‘too difficult to understand’.
Non-cognitive language, such as myth and symbol, is used to convey religious truths which are beyond factual description. Although this may make it ‘difficult to understand’ for some, it is the only way in which some religious ideas can be conveyed because they are beyond the world of empirical facts. For example, creation myths are based on non-cognitive language to convey religious truths about the relationship between God and humans, between man and woman and the natural order, about the epistemic distance and the nature of evil and suffering. These truths are beyond factual claims, but need to be conveyed in a narrative form, making use of mythological ideas and symbols. Although these forms may make religious language ‘difficult to understand’ to the modern mind, historically, these would have been the only way of communicating religious ideas to the general audience. The modern mind focuses too much on the possibility of the myth being ‘true’ rather than on the meaning of it, which would have been self-evident to the original hearers. Hence, Bultmann claimed that we need to demythologise the narrative to arrive at the kernel of truth which is embedded in myth. As Bultmann observed, ‘It is impossible to use electric light and the wireless and to avail ourselves of modern surgical discoveries and at the same time believe in the New Testament world of demons and spirits.’
Paragraph 4 could include an explanation of the use of symbol and why it may lead to the charge of religious language being ‘too difficult to understand’.
Symbols both identify and participate in that which they are intended to convey. They differ from signs, which provide information or instructions but do not point beyond themselves to a deeper meaning. They may be pictorial or verbal, and are universally recognisable, such as the cross which, for Christians, conveys not just the means of Jesus’ death but also his resurrection, salvation from sin, and hope for an afterlife. Use of symbols is very rich and complex — for example, when used in religious art — and will mean very little to the hearer or viewer without a background of religious knowledge. In the modern world, religious symbols have in some cases become so overexposed that we have been desensitised to their meaning and hence their real significance may be ‘too difficult’ for the modern mind to grasp.
Paragraph 5 could include an explanation of the role of language games and how they may help/hinder understanding of religious language.
The problems of understanding religious language may be solved, however, by recognising that religious language is part of a language game. Ludwig Wittgenstein proposed that language reflects a form of life: ‘the limits of my language are the limits of my world’. If we are not part of that form of life then we will not understand the language used by those who are part of that form of life. Wittgenstein argued that we cannot understand a lion’s world so we cannot understand its language, and the same applies to religious talk, such as talk of a ‘soul’ which is difficult to understand if we think of it as part of the physical world. Once we grasp that it is a non-physical concept then we can begin to understand the function the word serves in its context. Language game theory reflects a coherence theory of truth — the view that statements are true if they fit with other statements and beliefs which are internally coherent. In this case, it is not necessary to ask for factual support to make a claim understandable, we just need to know what the beliefs which lie behind it are.
The outcome is a clear, well-organised essay that shows the candidate is confident in writing about a range of types of religious language and is able to respond directly to the question set. They have only addressed what the question requires and so they have been able to hold in reserve material about verification and falsification for the second part of the essay, if required. Part of the challenge of this question is that it asks candidates to write about three different approaches to religious language in one 18-mark question. This could lead to candidates over-writing and running out of time or not managing to do justice to all three. Here the candidate has measured their time and resources wisely and covered all three appropriately.
This ‘Edexcel special’ is the responsibility of RELIGIOUS STUDIES REVIEW and has been neither provided nor approved by Edexcel.