Maimonides’ virtue ethics
Glenn Bezalel returns with a further article on Maimonides’ contribution to ethics
OCR: G582 A2 Religious Ethics
Moses Maimonides (1135–1204) is considered the greatest and most controversial of the Jewish medieval philosophers. While his extensive and diverse work changed the course of Jewish law and theology, his influence beyond the Jewish world is also of real importance, if sometimes understated.
In the realm of ethics alone, Alasdair MacIntyre writes in the second edition of his A Short History of Ethics (2002): ‘There is no name whose absence from the index of [the first edition of this book] is more regretted by me now than that of Maimonides.’ For Maimonides’ ethical writings, which were heavily influenced by Aristotle, were significant in the development of virtue ethics and natural law. At the same time, he also provided a forceful attack on determinism, specifically the idea of pre-determinism. This article will argue that Maimonides’ libertarian approach to free will is essential in understanding his agent-centred moral worldview.
Revelation and reason
Maimonides was born and raised in Córdoba, Andalusia, in the southern part of Spain. The rich cultural legacy of the region would have a lasting impact on Maimonides’ legal and philosophical beliefs. During this ‘golden age’ of Islamic philosophy, Andalusian Jews, like Maimonides, benefited greatly from the advances of Arabic thought, which had developed the intellectual heritage of ancient Greece and Rome. Maimonides was indebted to Muslim scholars such as Al-Farabi (tenth century), Avicenna (eleventh century) and Averroes, his contemporary, praising their works as the pathway towards Aristotle.
Though firmly rooted in Jewish biblical and Talmudic traditions, which he mastered from a relatively young age, Maimonides was prepared to reinterpret long-standing Jewish theology in light of the broader philosophy he absorbed. In a letter he wrote to a student, Maimonides described Aristotle as having ‘reached the highest level of knowledge to which man can ascend, with the exception of one who experiences the emanation of the Divine Spirit’. Such reverence for Aristotle highlighted the manner in which Maimonides would incorporate the truths of reason into the divine revealed truth of Jewish theology and law. It cannot be overstated how radical and controversial this approach was within the Jewish world, in part causing a major rift with prominent traditional scholars who encouraged the burnings of Maimonides’ works for their alleged heresy due to the undue influence from non-Jewish philosophical sources.
The open and tolerant environment of Andalusia did not last, as an Islamic fundamentalist group called the Almohads conquered Córdoba in 1148, causing many Jews to flee or face forced conversion to Islam. Together with his family, the young Maimonides left for Morocco, eventually settling in Egypt, where he ultimately became the personal physician to the royal family and served as leader of the Jewish community.
Maimonides the virtue ethicist
It was in Egypt that Maimonides wrote the Mishneh Torah, an unparalleled code of Jewish law. This 14-volume work included the Laws of Moral Character, which elevated the idea of virtuous conduct as a religious obligation. Yet, as Walter Wurzburger, a twentieth-century Jewish ethicist, points out:
‘Although one may be tempted to attribute [Maimonides’] predilection for virtue to Aristotelian influences, it must be borne in mind that for Maimonides, ethics represent not a quest for personal happiness of self-realisation but a response to the religious imperative of imitatio Dei — imitating God.’
With Jewish ethics rooted in the Halakhah (Jewish law), Maimonides employed key halakhic principles to frame the cultivation of the virtues that will allow a person to fully carry out their religious obligations. With humanity created in the image of God, each person can only reach his or her potential by imitating the divine and perfect being. Maimonides quotes the prophets who describe God according to his attributes that we are meant to imitate:
‘Slow to anger,’ ‘Abundant in kindness,’ ‘Righteous,’ ‘Just,’ ‘Perfect,’ ‘Almighty,’ ‘Powerful,’ and the like…these are good and just paths. A person is obligated to accustom himself to these paths and [to try to] resemble Him to the extent of his ability.
The Book of Knowledge, Laws of Human Dispositions 1:6
It is important to recognise that Maimonides’ support for cultivating the ‘middle path’ was not simply a concession to Aristotle but the fulfilment of the biblical commandment, ‘And you shall walk in His ways’ (Deuteronomy 28:9).
This commandment, mitzvah, is explained by the Talmud as follows:
‘Just as He is called ‘Gracious,’ you shall be gracious; Just as He is called ‘Merciful,’ you shall be merciful; Just as He is called ‘Holy,’ you shall be holy.,
Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Shabbat 133b
How is this to be achieved? For Maimonides, a person needs to train themselves to follow these temperaments until they are a permanent fixture of their personality.
‘He should perform, repeat and perform a third time the acts which conform to the standards of the middle road temperaments. He should do this constantly, until these acts are easy for him and do not present any difficulty. Then, these temperaments will become a fixed part of his personality.’
The Book of Knowledge, Laws of Human Dispositions 1:7
A prominent practical example given Maimonides is with regard to the laws of charity (tzedaka). Rather than give a one-off lump sum, Maimonides advised giving smaller sums regularly, for each act of giving transforms the giver, imbuing him or her with the trait of generosity. Such an approach to practical ethics accentuates Maimonides’ concern for an agent-centred morality as opposed to the act-centred approaches of, say, Kantians or utilitarians. As Wurzburger writes: ‘The belief that conduct moulds attitudes and dispositions is a cornerstone of the Maimonidean ethics.’
Indeed, for Maimonides, the very purpose of observing religious commandments is in order to refine human character:
‘Every commandment from among these 613 commandments exists either to communicate a correct opinion, or to put an end to an unhealthy opinion, or to communicate a rule of justice, or to ward off an injustice, or to endow men with a noble moral quality, or to warn them against an evil moral quality.’
The Guide for the Perplexed III :31
Maimonides vs Aristotle
Moshe Halbertal, an Israeli philosopher, notes that because Maimonides’ virtue ethics are ultimately rooted in Torah law, a key clash arises in practical terms between Aristotle and Maimonides with regard to the quality of humility.
MAIMONIDES WOULD INCORPORATE THE TRUTHS OF REASON INTO THE DIVINE REVEALED TRUTH OF JEWISH THEOLOGY AND LAW.
FOR ARISTOTLE’S VIRTUOUS CITIZEN, THE GOLDEN MEAN OF ‘MAGNANIMITY’ SHOULD BE ADHERED TO, BETWEEN THE VICES OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY.
For Aristotle’s virtuous citizen, the golden mean of ‘magnanimity’ should be adhered to, between the vices of pride and humility. For while ‘vain people…are foolish, and ignorant of themselves’, those who are ‘timid’ are no better as ‘each sort of person aims at what is in accordance with his worth, and these people abstain from noble actions and projects, and similarly from external goods, because they feel unworthy of them’ (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 4, Chapter 3). Rather, the ‘great-souled person’ will know their worth and take a ‘moderate view’ of the honours bestowed upon them.
In contrast, Maimonides’ ideal person, based on religious imperatives, departs from the mean when humility is at stake. As Maimonides writes in Mishneh Torah:
‘There are temperaments with regard to which a man is forbidden to follow the middle path. He should move away from one extreme and adopt the other.’
‘Among these is arrogance. If a man is only humble, he is not following a good path. Rather, he must hold himself lowly and his spirit very unassuming.’
The Book of Knowledge, Laws of Human Dispositions 2:3
This is echoed within Christian thought, which regards pride as the ‘the great sin’, according to C. S. Lewis (Mere Christianity, Chapter 8). Lewis writes: ‘According to Christian teachers, the essential vice, the utmost evil, is Pride.’ Indeed, for Lewis pride ‘is the complete anti-God state of mind’. Similarly, Maimonides (Laws of Human Dispositions 2:3) warned: ‘Whoever is arrogant is as if he denied God’s presence, as implied by Deuteronomy 8:14: “And your heart will be haughty and you will forget God, your Lord.”’
Such advice is extended to the trait of anger, which Maimonides describes as ‘an exceptionally bad quality’. Again, favouring Talmudic guidance over the Aristotelian virtues, Maimonides (Laws of Human Dispositions 2:3) warns that: ‘anyone who becomes angry is like one who worships idols’. Instead, one should ‘distance himself from anger and accustom himself not to feel any reaction, even to things which provoke anger. This is the good path.’ For the religious follower, such saintly conduct and negation of self-interest would be a prerequisite for a sincere worship of God. In contrast, Aristotle’s ideal citizen would see this obsequiousness as a vice.
The importance of free will
Underlying the person’s struggle towards moral conduct motivated by virtue is the notion of free will. Following the Laws of Moral Character, Maimonides formulates the Laws of Repentance where, as Professor Isadore Twersky of Harvard University observed, Maimonides suggests that moral conduct which involves a struggle against inclinations should be assigned a higher moral status than effortless moral conduct that is motivated by virtue.
A wonderful mockingbird
Let’s compare two great cultural heroes to draw out this difference. For a follower of Maimonides, the character George Bailey in Frank Capra’s 1946 film It’s a Wonderful Life is to be seen as the ultimate kind of virtuous hero, who goes on to do the right thing after heart-wrenching moral struggles. In contrast, the resolute Atticus Finch in Harper Lee’s 1960 novel To Kill a Mockingbird never faces such angst and trauma: he knows what is right and follows through without question. To be sure, Maimonides is seeking the final product, an Atticus Finch, a being endowed with desirable character traits. Yet the process of reaching this goal, which George Bailey succeeds at so admirably, is Maimonides’ focus.
This is why free will, necessary for true repentance, is at the heart of Maimonides’ ethical thought.
‘Free will is granted to all men. If one desires to turn himself to the path of good and be righteous, the choice is his. Should he desire to turn to the path of evil and be wicked, the choice is his.’
The Book of Knowledge, Laws of Repentance 5:1
An uncompromising stance
Maimonides’ libertarian stance on free will is uncompromising. Yet again, as a religious philosopher, Maimonides bases his view on biblical principles, citing Genesis 3:22, for after Adam and Eve have eaten from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, God declares: ‘Behold, man has become unique as ourselves, knowing good and evil.’ For Maimonides, the significance of the story is in its outcome:
‘the human species became singular in the world with no other species resembling it in the following quality: that man can, on his own initiative, with his knowledge and thought, know good and evil, and do what he desires. There is no one who can prevent him from doing good or bad.’
The Book of Knowledge, Laws of Repentance 5:1
And like a good virtue ethicist Maimonides seeks role models to inspire the virtuous life: ‘Each person is fit to be righteous like Moses, our teacher’, declares Maimonides, with each person able to choose the path he wishes. The biblical Moses, whom the Torah (Numbers 12:3) calls ‘a very humble man, more humble than anyone else on the face of the earth’, embodies the ideal character traits to emulate. Moses, a prince of Egypt, chose to give up all the trappings of royalty in order to side with his people of birth, a slave nation. The belief in right over might, a radical step in the ancient world, continues to provide inspiration for liberation movements up to our own time.
Maimonides goes as far to claim that the principle of free will is:
‘a fundamental concept and a pillar on which rests the totality of the Torah and commandments [mitzvot] as Deuteronomy 30:15 states: ‘Behold, I have set before you today life and good, death and evil.’ Similarly, Deuteronomy 11:26 states, ‘Behold, I have set before you today the blessing and the curse,’ implying that the choice is in your hands.’
The Book of Knowledge, Laws of Repentance 5:3
Alluding to Augustinian Christian pre-destination, Maimonides slams ‘the fools among the gentiles’ as well as ‘the undeveloped among Israel’ who believe ‘that, at the time of a man’s creation, The Holy One, blessed be He, decrees whether he will be righteous or wicked’ (Laws of Repentance 5:2). For Maimonides, a determinist viewpoint would undermine the whole notion of justice: rewarding or punishing people for their actions. At the heart of virtue ethics is the concept of responsibility: a person must be responsible for the free choices they make in order to be considered virtuous.
God’s omniscience vs human free choice
Maimonides concludes his discussion of free will in the Mishneh Torah by aiming to tackle the question of belief in God’s omniscience together with a belief in free will, both of which he fully adheres to.
‘If He [God] knows that a person will be righteous, [it appears] impossible for him not to be righteous. However, if one would say that despite His knowledge that he would be righteous, it is possible for him to be wicked, then His knowledge would be incomplete.’
The Book of Knowledge, Laws of Repentance 5:5
Accepting that such a conundrum is a Hercul ean task to take on, Maimonides characteristically tells his reader: ‘the statements that I will make must be known and understood [as a basis for the comprehension of this matter]’.
Unwilling to flinch from the traditional standpoints of an omniscient and omnipotent God who allows full free will for mankind, Maimonides turns to Isaiah 55:8 for his guiding principle: ‘For My thoughts are not your thoughts, nor are your ways My ways, says the Lord.’ The failure of philosophers to resolve the dilemma, according to Maimonides, is rooted in the childish error of comparing God’s nature to our own. Rather, man cannot comprehend God’s essence, and because God is simple, a unity, his knowledge and essence are one and the same. In turn, ‘just as it is beyond the potential of man to comprehend and conceive the essential nature of the Creator…so, too, it is beyond man’s potential to comprehend and conceive the Creator’s knowledge.’ In this manner, Maimonides preserves a belief in God’s perfect knowledge together with humanity’s ability to freely choose.
MAIMONIDES PRESERVES A BELIEF IN GOD’S PERFECT KNOWLEDGE TOGETHER WITH HUMANITY’S ABILITY TO FREELY CHOOSE.
While this may prove theologically more palatable than Boethius’ emasculated God, who is reduced to a mere observer of human choices, Maimonides is criticised for ‘dodging’ the question of how God’s omniscience can actually work in harmony with full will, ‘hiding’ behind a person’s finite understanding of God’s ways. Maimonides’ response? He would no doubt ask for his critics to accept the virtue of humility and appreciate that humankind will remain limited in its understanding of the ineffable.